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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

action

arises out

of Wagner's

supplying

construction

materials for the construction of approximately 25,000 square feet of
office space configured in two complexes for Hercules. Two causes of
action were brought against Hercules. On motion for summary judgment,
the trial court dismissed Wagner's cause of action for foreclosure of
its mechanic's lien against Hercules interest in the subject property.
This dismissal was based upon the trial court's legal conclusion that
Hercules' interest in the subject property was not alienable and,
therefore, was not subject to attachment by a mechanic's lien.
Following trial, the court dismissed Wagner's cause of action against
Hercules for failure to obtain a payment bond.
based

upon the trial

court's legal

This dismissal was

conclusion

that the office

complexes did not constitute an improvement upon land.
Wagner

vigorously

objected

to

the

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law and a final judgment prepared by Hercules based, in
part, upon the exclusion of undisputed facts which should have been
and were in fact part of the factual analysis upon which the trial
court based its legal conclusions. Despite these objections by Wagner
to the findings of fact and conclusions of law and to the final
judgment, the trial court signed and entered the findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the final judgment in substantially the same
form as prepared by Hercules.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed both the dismissal
of Wagner's mechanic's lien cause of action and the dismissal of
Wagner's cause of action for failure to obtain a payment bond against
Hercules.
The facts in this case are mostly undisputed. However, the facts
1
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as stated

by Hercules, while mostly

accurate, do contain some

inaccuracies and mischaracterizations. Furthermore, facts helpful to
this Court's understanding of the case were omitted by Hercules.
Therefore, Wagner sets forth facts hereafter which attempt to overcome
the inadequacies in Hercules' statement of the case.
1.

This action arises out of the Wagner supplying construction

materials for the construction of approximately 25,000 square feet of
office space in two complexes for Defendant-Appellee Hercules. Trial
Transcript —

R. at 640, pp. 50 & 51.

2. The office space was constructed in two office complexes with
30 modular office units, 14 feet by 60 feet each.

One complex

contains 19 units, Annex 15, and the other complex contains 11 units,
Annex 16.

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3 —

R. at 217.

3. Hercules entered into a contract with Defendant Modulaire for
the

construction

of

the

office

complexes

on

property

located

approximately at 4100 South 8400 West (Affidavit of Ryder Christian
Waring, Exhibit 2 -- R. at 247); Modulaire entered into a subcontract
with Space Building Systems for the completion to "complete interior
rough & finish walls & ceiling complete" (Affidavit of Chilton Leach,
Exhibit 4, Cover Sheet and Article 1.1 —
4.

R. at 226); 1

From July 8, 1985, through September 26, 1985, Wagner

supplied certain construction supplies and materials to Space Building
Systems, which were installed, integrated and incorporated into the
office complexes

(Trial Transcript at p. 7.

Trial Transcript,

Testimony of Robert Spencer, Ben Gabaldon and Larry Bills) and Wagner
1

On October 10, 1985, Space Building Systems filed for
relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

was not paid by Space Building Systems in full for the materials it
furnished to the project (Trial Transcript at pp. 11-13).

Defendants

refused to make payment therefor.
5.

The

construction

contract

between

Space

Building

and

Modulaire is an Associated General Contractors of America Standard
Subcontract

Agreement

for

Building

Construction

(hereinafter

"subcontract"), with Modulaire?s name and logo attached to the title
page, signed as subcontractor and contractor, respectively. Affidavit
of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, Subcontract Cover Sheet and pp.
R.

at 226.

1, 7 --

The subcontract refers to Hercules as the Owner.

Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, subcontract Cover Sheet -- R.
at 226.
6.

The subcontract of Space Building

Systems encompassed

complete "electrical rough & finish interior."

Affidavit of Chilton

Leach, Exhibit 4, section 1.1 -- R. at 226.
7. The subcontract entitled Modulaire to lien waivers from Space
Building, allowed

deduction of payments to Space Building from

Modulaire due to any claim of lien, required Space Building to keep
the building reasonably clean from debris, permitted Modulaire to
require a performance bond and labor and material payment bond if it
so chose, and stated that any disputes arising from the subcontract
shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 3.6, 6
and 10.1 (Emphasis Supplied) —
£•

R. at 226.

The Purchase Order between Modulaire and Hercules for

procurement of the office complexes refers to them as "complexes" and
"office complexes." Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3, pp. 1, 4 3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- R. at 217,
9.

The Purchase Order states that Hercules is "responsible for

site preparation, sewer, water and electrical service hookups." Ld. at

2.
10.

Complete water, sewer, telephone and electrical lines have

been constructed and affixed to the office complexes; the wheels and
hitches are removed; concrete sidewalks and stairs with steel railings
lead to the office complexes; grading was performed in preparation for
the office complexes; significant amounts of asphalt were placed to
create extensive parking areas with the asphalt fitting snugly within
the serrated

skirting and extending halfway up the skirting in

certain areas; several units are joined to form expansive office
complexes; Annex 15 is "L" shaped, joined by an enclosed, suspended
walkway; Annex 16 is terraced and joined by interior stairwells; rain
gutters and air conditioning units are attached; the interior is
completely finished with carpet and drywall overlapping the joints of
the connected, prefabricated shells; the office complexes, costing
nearly one half million dollars, rest on a permanent foundation of
cinder block; and the proposal for expansion of the parking lot for
Annex 16 refers to the annex as "Building."
Faux; Exhibit "1" —
11.

Affidavit of Kurt C.

R. at 405.

The Use Agreement with the United States Government grants

Hercules wide-ranging use and control of all the "facilities" (the
term "facilities" under the Use Agreement means "all property provided
under the contract"). Affidavit of Ryder Christian Waring, Exhibit 2,
General Provisions For Facilities Use Contracts, Clause Numbers 1, 2,
6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15 and 29 —
12.

R. at 247.

The photographic exhibits presented at the trial clearly
4
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show that the removal of a modular office complex near the subject
complexes left large holes in the asphalt, conduit and utility stubouts protruding from the ground, etc.
13.

The interior walls of the office complexes were finished

with traditionally

finished drywall partition walls rather than

"demountable" partitions as stated by Hercules.

The document at

Record 170, Exhibit 4, does not specify demountable partitions as
Hercules would lead this Court to believe. The testimony at the trial
was that while demountable partitions were common in the Modulaire
office units, the Hercules units were of traditional interior wall
finish.
ARGUMENT
The best argument for Wagner's position in opposing Hercules'
petition is in the Court of Appeals' Opinion.

It is a well reasoned

legal approach to the factual circumstances presented in this case.
Wagner encourages this Court to read the Opinion of the Court of
Appeals.
I.

HERCULES HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY FOR THE COURT ANY VALID "SPECIAL
AND IMPORTANT REASONS" WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF CERTIORARI.
As a preliminary matter, Wagner does not believe that Hercules

has complied with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which govern
petitions for certiorari from the Utah Court of Appeals to the Utah
Supreme Court. Rule 49(e) states that "The failure of the petitioner
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential
to a ready understanding of the points requiring consideration will be
sufficient grounds for denying the petition."

There is a reason for

this rule. A petition for certiorari is not the means of arguing the
merits of

the case, but is to provide
5

the

Court with
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enough

information

to

determine

whether

to

actually

issue

a writ of

certiorari and hear the merits of the case.
Rather than presenting a brief, concise and clear petition,
Hercules has chosen to burden the Court with a lengthy discussion of
the details of the case which do not assist the Court in determining
whether to issue a writ of certiorari.

Therefore, Wagner requests

that the Court deny the Hercules' petition for lack of brevity and
clarity.
Hercules has requested that this Court review the Utah Court of
Appeals decision in this case which was filed on August 31, 1990.2
However, Hercules has failed to present this Court with valid reasons
upon which to grant a review. Furthermore, there are no valid reasons
for such a petition in this case.

The rules governing petitions of

certiorari from the Utah Court of Appeals to this Court are set forth
in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 45 through 51.
"Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
judicial

discretion, and will

be granted

only

for special and

important reasons." Rule 46 (emphasis added). Rule 46 further states
four specific reasons which may form a valid basis for consideration
of issuance of a writ of certiorari.

Although they are groundless,

Hercules petitioned the Court of appeals for rehearing of
the case based upon several reasons, including those upon
which Hercules now petitions this Court for a writ of
certiorari. After briefing by the parties, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition for rehearing only on the
issue of attorneys fees which had been awarded under Utah
Code Annotated § 14-2-3. See, Opinion, Page 20. Since
the attorneys1 fees provisions in Section 14-2-3 had been
enacted during the pendency of the appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals modified its
decision by way of an order filed on November 26, 1990,
and deleted the award of attorneys' fees under Section
14-2-3.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Hercules has cited only two of these as the basis for its petition.
The reasons cited by Hercules are quoted from the rule as follows:
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided
a question of state or federal law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court;
* * *

(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has
not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(b) and (d). Hercules has
offered no other "special and important reasons" for consideration of
its petition.
With regard to subsection (b) of Rule 46, the decision of the
Court of Appeals does decide issues of Utah State law but none of
these holdings is in conflict with any decision of the Utah Supreme
Court.

In particular, Hercules claims the decision in Paul Mueller

Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982) is in
conflict with the Utah Court of Appeals decision herein. However, the
Court of Appeals clearly, and correctly, distinguished Mueller from
the case at bar and held that "buildings" are not to be treated the
same as personal property/fixtures, to which Mueller applies in
determining what constitutes a fixture or "improvement" to real
property.

See, Opinion, Pages 8 and 9.3

Further, even if Mueller were to be applied to determine the
legal nature of the modular office complexes, the property in question
clearly meets the Mueller tests and establishes that the modular

While the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is
published at 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1990), Hercules has
provided a copy of the original Opinion as part of its
Addendum and all references in its petition for
certiorari are to the original. Therefore, in order to
assure consistency, Wagner's references herein will be to
the original Opinion.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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office complexes are part of the property interest of Hercules in the
subject realty.4

Therefore, Hercules' petition based upon subsection

(b) of Rule 46 is without merit and should be denied.5
With regard to subsection (d) of Rule 46, Hercules petition is
even less persuasive.

This Court has already determined that the

issues presented herein are not of the type that need to be settled by
the Utah Supreme Court. This Court had exclusive appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (j ).

However, by

Order of Transfer dated January 10, 1989 and pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2-2(4) and Rule 4A of the former Utah Rules of the
Supreme Court, this Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of
Appeals for determination.
The issues presented by Hercules petition for certiorari are

Throughout its petition herein, as in the appeal to the
Utah Court of Appeals, Hercules attempts to mischaracterize the nature of the office complexes by continually
referring to them as "mobile". The complexes are no more
mobile than any other building manufactured in "modular"
units. The Court of Appeals recognized this literary
deception and exposed it for what it is -- "inaccurate".
See, Opinion, Page 10 and 11.
In claiming that the Court of Appeals decision is in
conflict with the Mueller case, Hercules completely
ignores the interface and interplay that Mueller must
have with several other Utah Supreme Court cases. See,
Opinion, Pages 8-14; Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85
P.2d 363, modified in part, 85 P.2d 1012 (1906); Stanton
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207
(1959); Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16
Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964); and King Bros., Inc. v.
Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P. 2d
17
(1968). When taken as a whole, the Court of Appeals
decision herein is in harmony with all of the cases
decided by the Utah Supreme Court. Further, the Court of
Appeals' decision is supported by other state courts in
the Western United States. See, Waldorf v. Elliott, 214
Or. 437, 330 P.2d 355 (1958); and Rinaldi v. Goller, 48
Cal. 2d 276, 309 P.2d 451 (1957).
These cases are
discussed more fully in the sections that follow.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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precisely the issues which this Court reviewed in deciding to transfer
the case to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the issues presented by
Hercules do not fall within the scope of Rule 46(d).
Thus, Hercules has failed to identify for the Court any valid
"special and important reasons" which would justify the issuance of a
writ of certiorari or any further delay in the fulfillment of Wagnerfs
remedies under the Utah mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION IN THE PRESENT CASE IS NOT IN
CONFLICT WITH PAUL MUELLER CO. V. CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION,
657 P.2D 1279 (UTAH 1982) AND IS IN HARMONY WITH ALL OF THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT CASES WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED.
The Court of Appeals held that the Mueller case does not apply to

the present case.

It reached this conclusion from a reasoned review

of the language of the payment bond statute and the mechanic's lien
statue. With regard to the type of work covered, the language of the
two statutes is very similar.
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985), states
that the payment bond provisions apply to "The owner of any interest
in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the
construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building,
structure or improvement upon land . . . ."

(emphasis added).

Further, Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended in 1981),
states that "Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building,
structure or improvement to any premises in any manner . . . shall
have a lien upon the property . • . ."

(emphasis added).

The personal property/fixture distinction as discussed in Mueller
deals with items which are attached to a building (i.e., equipment)

9
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rather than to the actual building itself.

The Mueller case is

limited specifically to relatively small individual items rather than
to entire buildings or structures. Given the statutory language, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the Mueller test does not apply to two
buildings containing more than 25,000 square feet of office space.
On the other hand, to carry Hercules1 argument to its full
extension, one would have to conclude that the metal building in the
Mueller case to which the equipment was attached would not give rise
to a mechanic's lien or to payment bond liability since such metal
buildings are removable without too much difficulty and would be
conducive to various uses of the property.
case in Mueller.

However, such was not the

The manwalks were considered to be lienable items,

and, therefore, presumably the building would be a lienable item also.
With

regard

mechanic's

lien

to this
statute

issue, the operative
is

"the

language of the

construction,

alteration,

or

improvement of any building, structure or improvement to the premises
in any manner."

Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953).

The operative

language of the payment bond statute is "the construction, addition
to, alteration, or repair of any building, structure or improvement
upon land."

Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985).

These phrases indicate the type of work which is covered by the
statutes and the objects of such work. First, there must be construction, addition to, alteration, or repair work.

This work must relate

to (1) a "building," (2) a "structure," or (3) an "improvement upon
land."

There are three distinct categories in the statute and Muller

applies only to the last (e.g., improvement upon land).

The Court of

Appeals recognized this distinction and correctly held that Mueller
does not apply to this case.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Utah, there has never been any question that buildings or
structures are covered by these statutes, even though they could be
moved from the land.

See, Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363,

modified in part, 85 P. 1012 (1906) (mechanic's lien attached to both
old and new real property when a house was improved at the old
property and subsequently moved to the new property).

See also,

Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207
(1959) (mechanic's lien allowed for the transportation of a temporary
structure to the liened property).

It is only in connection with

"improvements upon land11 that the issue of personal property v.
fixtures became critical.
distinction now.

There is no reason to depart from that

Clearly the office complexes comprise buildings or

structures upon the subject property.

Blacks Law Dictionary defines

"building" as a:
Structure designed for habitation, shelter, storage,
trade, manufacture, religion, business, education, and
the like. A structure or edifice inclosing a space
within walls, and usually, but not necessarily, covered
with a roof.
Black's Law Dictionary 1979, p. 176.

Further, Blacks Law Dictionary

defines "structure" as
Any construction, or any production or piece
of work artificially built up or composed of
parts joined together in some definite manner.
That which is built or constructed; an edifice or
building of any kind.
A combination of materials to form a construction
for occupancy, use or ornamentation whether installed
on, above, or below the surface of a parcel of land.
Black's Law Dictionary 1979, p. 1276.

See also, 12 C.J.S. Building

(1980).
It is important to note that there is no requirement for
affixation or attachment to the land upon which it is placed. In fact
11
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the definition of structure specifically allows for installation above
the land.
Such a result has been indicated previously by the Utah Supreme

i

Court in the case of King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21
Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968).

The Court stated:
(

The duty of obtaining a bond as imposed by
Section 14-2-1 is upon: "The owner of any
interest in land" who enters into a contract to
construct an improvement thereon.
The word
"land" as used in the law, has since time
immemorial been regarded as a generic term. It
"* * * includes not only the soil, but everything
attached to it, whether by nature, as trees,
herbage, and water, or by the hand of man, as
buildings, fixtures, and fences."
This is
particularly true with respect to these lien
statutes which should be liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes.
This court has
allowed a materialman's lien to attach to
interests less than fee simple, such as a
leasehold estate, an equitable interest, and a
building separate and apart from the soil upon
which it was erected. (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original)
King Brothers at 440 P.2d 19.

<

It is clear that the Utah Supreme Court views "buildings" as
separate and distinct from "fixtures." A building does not have to be
attached to the soil in the same manner as a fixture must be attached
in order to give rights to mechanic's lien and bond rights.

It is

sufficient that the "buildings" or "structures" of this magnitude be
placed upon the land.

Thus, buildings or structures of the magnitude

in this case should be deemed to be part of the realty upon which they
are placed regardless of the manner in which they are placed upon the
land.
This is particularly true given the ability of man to move even
traditionally constructed buildings with relative ease and the advance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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realty.
Similarly, in the case at bar, it was appropriate for the Court
of Appeals to not rely too heavily on the agreements to which Wagner
was not privy.

As between Hercules and Wagner, the office complexes

should be deemed to be part of the realty.

Such a holding makes good

common sense.
Such a holding not only make good common sense, it is in accord
with other Utah case law.

In Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of

Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964), the Utah Supreme Court
confronted a situation similar to the one presented in the present
case.

In Metals Manufacturing, the Bank of Commerce held a 10-year

lease which provided that the Bank could "make alterations, attach
fixtures, and erect additions * * *" which would remain the property
of the bank and be removed upon the expiration of the lease.

A

second-tier supplier and installer of metal hand rails and grates made
a claim for failure to obtain a bond and the Bank defended on the
basis that the goods did not become fixtures due to the provisions in
the lease specifying that they remain the personal property of the
Bank.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Bank and dismissed the

supplier's cause of action.

In reversing the trial court, the Utah

Supreme Court held that:
[I]t would seem unrealistic and unreasonable to conclude that [the bank and its contractor] by agreeing
among themselves, could bind third party suppliers of
materials to the terms of an agreement to which such
suppliers were not privies and the terms of which they
did not know. Such conclusion could result in the easy
circumvention of the statute whose purpose clearly is
to protect suppliers, if what they supply falls within
the clear import of the statute.
(emphasis in
original)
Id. at 395 P.2d 914, 915.
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construction project-

-- »• • ;o,ver to protect its ricjM •
I

f Hercules '"hose in

, *.;. - working en or supplying materials to

This Court has stated that:

. . . The bond, as in this C a s e [ , ] is conditioned for
the faithful performance of the contract and securing
the payment of the laborers ai id materialmen,
if the
owner requires the contractor to procure the statutory
bond, he is protected against loss. If he does not, he
becomes liable to laborers and materialmen if the
contractor fails to pay them, even though he may have
paid the contractor in full. He has his remedy in his
own h a n d s .
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i
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 127, 167 P. 241, 246
(1917) (emphasis added).

Thus, Hercules had its remedy in its own

hands but chose to flout the statutory requirement to obtain a payment
bond.
III. NEITHER THE UTAH PAYMENT BOND STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 142-1 ET SEQ. (1953 AS AMENDED IN 1985), NOR THE UTAH MECHANIC'S
LIEN STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 38-1-1 ET SEQ. (1953 AS
AMENDED PRIOR TO 1985), REQUIRE FEE OWNERSHIP FOR THEIR
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR.
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985) states, in
pertinent part:
The owner of any interest in land entering into a
contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any
building, structure or improvement upon land shall . .
. obtain from the contractor a bond . . . .
(emphasis added).
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended in 1981) states, in
pertinent part that "Such [mechanic's] liens shall attach to only such
interest as the owner may have in the property

....

(emphasis added).
The

subject

real

property

is owned

Government and controlled by the Navy.

by

the United

States

Hercules uses this real

property to produce missiles for the Government.

In exchange for the

use of the subject real property, Hercules sells the missiles to the
Government than it otherwise would.
While neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals felt it
necessary to identify the exact nature of Hercules' interest in the
real property upon which the modular office complexes were placed,
there is no doubt that both viewed Hercules' interest as being

16
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Materialmen and laborers, who have "\^ ^racLoai wav
of knowing the legal status of the property they
improve, [King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21
Utah 2d 43, 440 P. 2d 17, 19 (1968)], would not know in
advance whether the property they are improving
tainted by a restraint on alienability . . . .

The trial court's ruling was not that Hercules interest
in the property was insufficient to invoke the payment
bond statute.
To the contrary, the trial court had
already ruled on that threshold issue and had determined
Hercules' interest in the real property sufficient.
Thus, the trial court refused to dismiss the payment bond
cause of action on Hercu] esf motion for summary judgment
prior to trial.
17
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some

Ultimately, recognizing alienability as a precondition
to the attachment of a mechanic's lien would destroy
the Mechanic's Lien Statute.
Owners could easily
circumvent the Mechanic's Lien Statute by simply
creating an alienable interest in land or in the
building. We will not adopt a rule permitting such
ready circumvention of the Mechanic's Lien Statute.
[Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah
74, 395 P.2d 914, 915 (1964)].
Opinion at p.15.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the alienability
of a particular property should not be considered in determining
whether a mechanic's lien could attach.
IV.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW EMPLOYED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS
CORRECT.
In its opinion herein, the Court of Appeals stated:
Inasmuch as the issues before us are limited to
questions of law, namely, questions of statutory
interpretation, no deference need to be given to the
trial court's conclusions.
Forbes v. St. Mark's
Hospital, 754 P. 2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988). We therefore,
we review the trial Court's statutory interpretations
for correctness.
Copper State Thrift and Loan v.
Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion at p. 6. Thus, the Court of Appeals employed the "correctness"
standard in reviewing the issues presented in Wagner's appeal.
The issues presented in Wagner's appeal were presented as legal
issues and Hercules defended them as such. Hercules now seeks to have
this Court impose a standard of review established
issues.7

for factual

The facts in this case were largely undisputed.

Thus, the

Court of Appeals did not disturb any of the factual issues on which
the trial court had made findings. The Court of Appeals reviewed the

Again, even if a factual standard of review were more
appropriate, which it is not, that would not constitute
a "special and important reason" for considering the
issuance of a writ of certiorari. Further, Hercules has
waived any such argument.
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V.

CONCLUSION.
Hercules has failed to identify any valid reasons for this Court

to consider the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The Opinion of the

^

Court of Appeals is not in conflict with any decisions of the Utah
To the contrary, the Court of Appeals1 Opinion is in

Supreme Court.
harmony

with

the

full body

of

case

law

interpreting

the Utah

<

mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes. Further, Hercules holds a
property interest in the subject real property as well as an interest
in the office complexes which is sufficient for Wagner's mechanic's
lien to attach.

The Court of Appeals applied the proper standard of

review to the legal issues presented in the appeal.

Hercules other

arguments contained in its petition are equally without merit.
Utah's mechanic's lien and bond laws are liberally construed to
protect those who provide labor, materials and equipment for projects
such as the modular office complexes built for Hercules. Hercules had
its "remedy in its own hands" and chose to ignore its statutory
obligations.

This Court should not punish Wagner for Hercules'

failure to obtain a payment bond.
Wagner respectfully requests that this Court deny Hercules'
petition for a writ of certiorari and allow the case to be remanded in
accordance with the Court of Appeals' decision.
DATED this 28th day of January, 1991.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
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